bitterlemons-international.org
Middle East Roundtable /
Edition 11
An Israeli View:
Two scenarios by
Yossi Alpher
[DEUTSCH]
In the past few days we have been presented with a new
disengagement plan from Israeli Acting Prime Minister Ehud Olmert (his
weekend press interviews) and a preliminary political program reportedly
delivered by Palestinian Prime Minister-designate Ismail Haniyeh to
President Mahmoud Abbas. Olmert's
intentions are fairly explicit--an unusual situation at election time in
Israel, when candidates tend to stick to generalities. He will allow Hamas
an opportunity to present itself as a viable negotiating partner but has
little faith that this will happen. When it doesn't, he will proceed with
further settlement dismantling based on a national dialogue. But he has
already determined the borders and will adjust the security fence
accordingly: expanded settlement blocs, the Jerusalem Jewish neighborhoods
and holy basin area with a few surrounding Arab neighborhoods, a land link
to Maaleh Adumim, and the Jordan Valley as security border.
The Palestinian reaction to this plan is uniformly negative. Hamas leader
Khaled Mishal termed it a "declaration of war".
Haniyeh's principles are in general equally plain. All forms of resistance
(read: suicide bombings) are legitimate. Existing agreements will be
"reassessed . . . in accordance with the rights of the Palestinian people".
The right of return means return to "homes and property". Continuation of
the current calm, or ceasefire, is conditioned on "the end of all Israeli
aggression and the release of prisoners". There is no mention of a two-state
solution, recognition of Israel, or the 1967 borders as the basis of a
Palestinian state. International relations will be based on an attempt to
"enlist Arab and Islamic support... in every sector".
Both of these political declarations are consistent with everything we know
about the two emerging governments. Both are undoubtedly the basis for
further refinement, deliberation and compromise. Haniyeh still needs the
blessing of Abbas, who reportedly termed the principles "vague", in order to
form a government. Olmert still needs to get elected and form a coalition.
But taking these schemes as our point of departure, we can begin to define
the parameters within which the coming months will play themselves out.
In a best-case scenario, Israel under a Kadima-Labor government will seek to
proceed with the dismantling of additional settlements in the West Bank,
initially through consultation with the settlers, ultimately through
legislation that offers generous compensation, and with an American
presidential blessing that quietly buries the roadmap. Though Olmert does
not discuss this explicitly, Israel will maintain temporary military control
over all or most of the evacuated areas as a security precaution and in
order to deny Hamas the claim of having liberated additional territory.
Hamas, despite its objections to Israel's unilateral heavy-handedness, will
nevertheless perceive a sufficient incentive to maintain the ceasefire.
Hamas, in turn, will integrate independent and Fateh-affiliated actors into
its coalition, and will merge its own armed forces with those of the PA.
Though it will not make all the concessions demanded by Israel and the
international community, some small degree of trust and basis for
communication will nevertheless develop and a modicum of aid will flow. The
Gaza passages will be at least partially open, and Gaza-West Bank economic
links will continue. Fateh will regroup, Abu Mazen will exercise some
leadership, and their pressure, coupled with Hamas' need for both funds and
minimum infrastructure coordination with Israel, will contribute to the
emergence of a modest new modus vivendi that could last a few years.
In contrast, in a worst-case scenario Hamas will encourage or at least
ignore terrorist attacks, and will nourish its own terrorist infrastructure
while expanding contacts with Syria and Iran ("Arab and Islamic support").
It will begin Islamizing Palestinian society. Israel will confront an
expanding circle of armed Islamists, installed in democratic elections, on
three fronts: Gaza, the West Bank and southern Lebanon. Iran will proceed
with its military nuclear program and will strive to integrate the Arab
Islamists in its sphere of influence.
Unrest will grow in Jordan and Egypt, sparked by sympathy and support for
Hamas. Israel will completely sever links between Gaza and the West Bank and
will seek to cooperate with Egypt in isolating Gaza, while encouraging Fateh
to recoup power in the West Bank. The Paris agreement that controls
Israeli-Palestinian economic integration will become defunct, de facto if
not de jure. The likelihood of a broad military confrontation of some sort
will increase. The international community will look for ways to isolate the
worsening conflict.
Reality, as is usually the case, will almost certainly fall somewhere in
between these two extreme scenarios. Perhaps the most promising conclusion
we can draw from them is that, while the future of Israel-Hamas relations
does not look good, it is still not set in stone.-
Published 13/3/2006 © bitterlemons.org
Yossi Alpher is coeditor of the bitterlemons family of internet
publications. He is former director of the Jaffee Center for Strategic
Studies at Tel Aviv University, and a former senior adviser to PM Ehud
Barak.
[DEUTSCH]
Bitterlemons-international.org is an internet
forum for an array of world perspectives on the Middle East and its
specific concerns. It aspires to engender greater understanding about
the Middle East region and open a new common space for world thinkers
and political leaders to present their viewpoints and initiatives on the
region. Editors Ghassan Khatib and Yossi Alpher can be reached at
ghassan@bitterlemons-international.org
and
yossi@bitterlemons-international.org, respectively.
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