The following article is extracted from the April
1997 issue of THE OTHER ISRAEL. The publisher encourages unrestricted
distribution with acknowledgment of source. BULLDOZERS OF
DEATH
Tel-Aviv, 26.3.97
These words are being written in a country in the midst of a deep
crisis, a country mourning innocent victims and waiting anxiously for a
bloody confrontation on which its government seems bent. I sit
behind the computer in a few calm hours, snatched from the daily effort
to organise protests and avert at the last moment the danger into which
the Netanyahu Government's criminal folly has brought us. It is now just
two months since the Hebron Agreement was signed, amidst a renewed
outburst of hope which touched even the more cynical and jaded of us.
Looking back on the past years, one realizes that it is not the first
time we have passed through a rapid transition from despair to hope --
and back again. In fact, such transitions seem to be a basic
characteristic of a peace process in which so many contradictory and
antagonistic forces are held together in an extremely unstable balance,
and which nevertheless endured through seemingly hopeless situations. On
the other hand, with every passing day it is becoming obvious that this
might be the deepest crisis and most dangerous moment since Oslo was
signed.
While waiting for the last-ditch mediation effort, I will take the
time to recount the main events of the past two months, and try to
reconstruct how we got to this point. By the time this issue reaches
print, things are likely to have resolved themselve -- for better or for
worse.
Looking back
In the middle of January, the long-delayed Hebron Agreement was
achieved at the end of five months' arduous Israeli-Palestinian
negotiations.
Though the predicted settler revolt against the redeployment did not
take place, one serious incident did accompany it: a shooting spree in
the Hebron marketplace by Israeli soldier Noam Friedman who was later
said to be mentally deranged. On this occasion, the Israeli and
Palestinian officers on the ground were able to take quick and
coordinated action: to apprehend and disarm Friedman before he could
succeed in the random killing of Palestinians; to calm down the angry
reactions of the Palestinian population and prevent a serious
conflagration. And meanwhile, the Hebron Agreement was ratified by a
large majority in the Knesset -- 87 out of 120, far more than was given
to any previous Israeli-Palestinian agreement.
The redeployment itself was carried out quickly and smoothly. Israeli
forces evacuated some 85% of Hebron, and tens of thousands gave Arafat a
tumultous welcome at the former military government headquarters. At the
same time, riots broke out in the other part of Hebron, the 15% left
under Israeli control -- where 20,000 Palestinians had been condemned to
remain under occupation, in order to "safeguard" the armed enclaves
housing some 450 religious- nationalist settlers. Thus was exhibited
from the very outset the basic instability of the Hebron deal, but at
the time it was re- garded as no more than an incident.
The media version of the event followed quite simple lines: that
Netanyahu had now formally bound himself to carry on the Oslo peace
process; that in token of his intentions he had brought about a military
withdrawal from a Palestinian city (or at least from the major part of
it); that he further obliged himself to a timetable for three further
redeployments of military forces in the West Bank; and that he had done
all this with far greater public and parliamentary support than Rabin or
Peres ever enjoyed, against only a feeble resistance from the right.
Few people actually read the full text of the Hebron Agreement, with
its closely-typed clauses couched in a language comprehensible only to
specialists. Still, some of the pitfalls were clearly visible, the most
obvious being that the agreement set out the dates of the three stages
of military redeployment -- but did not specify the territory to be
evacuated. Moreover, Netanyahu claimed for Israel the right to define
unilaterally the extent of territory to be evacuated, and though the
Americans declared their support for this curious interpretation, the
Palestinians most emphatically did not.
Even more problematic, at the end of the third redeployment, due in
August 1998, Israel is supposed to withdraw from all parts of the West
Bank except for "settlements and specified military locations." But
there is absolutely no agreement about the definition of the terms
"settlement" and "military location". According to the Israeli
interpretation ("settlements: that is also all land earmarked for future
expansion", and "military locations includes all present training
areas") at least half of the West Bank(!) would fall into one of these
categories.
The new peacemaker?
For some weeks, Prime Minister Netanyahu basked in the
unaccustomed praise of the international media, which welcomed him
without reservations to the Middle East Peacemakers' Club. The
Hebron redeployment was a conspicuous TV event, as was the release of
the thirty Palestinian women prisoners who had been waiting for this
moment since September 1995. (There was hardly any media mention of the
still-incarcerated 3,000 male prisoners, including more than 200
Administrative Detainees held without trial, nor was there much
attention for the brutal eviction of the Jahalin Bedouins to make place
for the extension of the Ma'ale Adumim settlement...)
In yet another media event Netanyahu and Arafat were shown cordially
shaking hands in the prestigious International Economic Conference at
Davos, Switzerland -- the annual forum where Shimon Peres used to
deliver speeches on "The New Middle East."
The Israeli business community started to consider "the new
Netanyahu" a fitting successor to Shimon Peres -- whose candidature had
been endorsed, less than a year earlier, by such organizations as the
Federation of Industrialists and the Chambers of Commerce.
Like Peres, Netanyahu now seemed to combine neo-Liberal economic
policies with a drive to open the markets of the Arab World to Israeli
goods; the business community enthusiastically supported Netanyahu, both
in the Hebron Agreement and in his confrontation with the unions during
their one-day general strike.
On January 31, the economic section of Yediot Aharonot bore the
headline: "The stagnation is over. Hebron Agreement revived stock
market, renews prospects for booming tourist season and warms up trading
links with the Arab World". This was accompanied by two photographs: a
jubilant Hebron boy, carrying an enormous Palestinian flag -- and a no
less jubilant stockbroker in Tel-Aviv, watching on a computer screen the
rocketing share prices.
Netanyahu's reputation as a peacemaker was further enhanced by the
emergence of an increasingly vocal intransigent nationalist faction
within the ruling coalition, led by such figures as Binyamin Begin who
resigned his cabinet position in protest against the Hebron Agreement.
With Netanyahu subjected to scathing abuse from the right -- often
using the very same terms of vilification which Netanyahu himself had
used against the Rabin and Peres governments -- it was quite natural for
many peace seekers to start giving credit to this Prime Minister, as
they did to Rabin after Oslo. The formerly popular Gush Shalom sticker
bearing the slogan 'What have you done today to help bring down the
government?' suddenly seemed no so appropriate in demonstrations and
events of the Israeli peace movement...
*** * ***
In the aftermath of the Hebron redeployment, the Israeli peace
movement at large went through demobilization, with participation in its
activities gradually reduced to the activist hardcore. The wider
circle of supporters -- those tens of thousands who especially after the
Rabin murder used to thong the squares of Tel-Aviv -- went back home. At
first, the situation seemed hopeful so why protest about "minor things";
then, within scant weeks, everything had suddenly turned so dark as to
seem hopeless.
Was it nothing but a charade? Was the big Netanyahu-Begin struggle,
which filled the papers for weeks on end, nothing but a cynical "good
cop, bad cop" show put up by con man Netanyahu for our benefit? There
were a few peace activists who said so, also at that quiet time a month
ago which now seems so distant.
Yet even in the bitter present one can recognise that the Hebron
Agreement was indeed a significant change, at least in Netanyahu's own
terms and those of his political milieu -- a change from total
unwillingness to concede anything at all to the Palestinians into a
willingness to give them a little bit (though far too little).
A party which traditionally revered each and every square inch of
Biblical "Eretz Yisrael" had come to the conclusion that at least some
of these lands must be given up. Moreover, the great majority of
Likud members and voters accepted this abandonment of once-sancrosanct
principles with surprising ease, to the chagrin of Begin and the other
diehards. The "not an inch" principle had been quietly dying during the
years of the Intifada and of Oslo, and Netanyahu merely delivered the
coup de grace.
Netanyahu's new line took him quite close to the traditional
positions of the Labor party, whose leaders ever since 1967 produced
various schemes for cutting up the West Bank, annexing considerable
parts to Israel while giving over the remainder to some kind of Arab
rule. The mood of ambiguity and uncertainty presently prevalent among
most of the Israeli population certainly owes much to this blurring of
political differences.
Netanyhu's plan, announced semi-officially in an interview to Ma'ariv
on March 21, is to divide the West Bank more or less in half between
Israel and the Palestinians; the fifty percent given to the Palestinians
would lack continuity and consist of several enclaves cut off from each
other and from the outside world by settlements and military zones.
For his part Ehud Barak, the man most likely to suceed Shimon Peres
as Labor Party leader, outlined several months ago an extensive program
of annexations, according to which some thirty to forty percent of the
West Bank would be annexed to Israel and the remainder given to the
Palestinians. 'The great ideological debate of our generation has been
reduced to a question of ten percent of the West Bank' concluded
commentator Ben Kaspit of Ma'ariv. This summation, however, leaves
outside calculation the standpoint of the Palestinians -- for whom the
West Bank and Gaza Strip, territories which in their entirety constitute
but 18% of historical Palestine, are but a bare minimum.
The convergence between Likud and Labor positions on the Palestinian
issue has made increasingly feasible the option of a "national unity"
government embracing both parties -- all the more since their
socio-economic policies have been practically identical for over a
decade (neo-liberalism somewhat tempered by the presence of "populist"
factions in both parties). For Shimon Peres, due to end his tenure as
Labor Party leader in June, a portfolio in a national unity government
would offer one last chance of entering the corridors of power. He leads
the Labor faction which supports the idea of entering the government, in
order "to free Netanyhu of pressures from the extreme right"; but the
idea is also embraced by many of these same rightwingers -- who
understand that such a cabinet, with a broader political base, would
have a stronger position against the Palestinians in the remaining
stages of negotiations.
Ironically, it is the hawkish Barak -- whose basic positions are not
too different from those of Netanyahu -- is steadfastly opposed to
"saving a rotten incompetent government which must be brought down."
For his part Yossi Beilin, long considered the most dovish of Labor
leaders, now watered down his views in order to produce a joint document
with Likud KM Michael Eitan, clearly intended to serve as the unofficial
draft program for a Likud-Labor government -- and at considerable
variance with the promises which Beilin reportedly made to the
Palestinians during the Rabin Government's tenure, of a state comprising
some 90% of the West Bank.
*** * ***
From corruption to extremism
For some time, Peres' constant courting of Netanyahu served the Prime
Minister well. Rather than actually taking Labor into his cabinet,
Netanyahu used the threat of doing so in order to neutralise the
pressures of the extreme right; and at the same time, he could rely on a
rather mild parliamentary opposition. But this delicate balance was
disrupted by a sudden bombshell dropped on the political scene by Ayalah
Hasson, star reporter of the Israeli First Channell TV: a corruption
scandal involving some of Netanyahu's senior ministers and advisers, and
possibly Netanyahu himself.
The report concerned Netanyahu's recent abortive attempt to have one
of his loyal supporters -- a lawyer named Roni Bar'on -- appointed to
the key position of Attorney-General. The Bar'on candidature had
foundered under scathing public criticism -- not only is Bar'on far from
a brilliant lawyer, but he was revealed to be involved in large-scale
gambling. At the time there was, however, no suspicion that anything
beyond a breach of good taste was involved in the affair.
Only several weeks later did the TV reporter come across evidence
that Bar'on may have promised -- in return for being appointed -- to
help Aryeh Der'i, a prominent religious politician who is undergoing a
prolonged corruption trial and still retains a key position as the
unquestioned kingmaker of Israeli politics. As head of the country's
criminal prosecution, Bar'on would have been in a position to suborn the
Der'i trial in various ways. In return, Der'i supposedly promised to
have his Shas Party support the Hebron deal. If proven true the affair
would constitute, under Israeli law, a criminal conspiracy carrying
heavy penalties for all involved.
The reporter, refusing to disclose her source, could not provide
evidence which would stand in court. Nevertheless, Netanyahu had no
choice but to approve the appointment of a Special Police Investigating
Team with wide powers. The affair quickly snowballed, with Justice
Minister Hanegbi being subjected to prolonged police interrogation --
followed by none other than Netanyahu himself, the first Israeli Prime
Minister to undergo such humiliation. In the press, comparisons were
frequently made with Watergate and the ignominious end of the Nixon
Presidency.
With the downfall of the Netanyahu Govenment suddenly seeming a very
concrete possibility, the idea of Labor joining the cabinet was
momentarily shelved, as the party leaders fell into sweet dreams of
ousting Netanyahu altogether. And with the government under constant
attack from that direction, an enormously strong bargaining position was
handed to the parliamentary ultra- nationalists, now officially
organised in the "Eretz Yisrael Front" which included no less than
seventeen out of the sixty-six Knesset Members on whose support
Netanyahu relies.
By joining with the opposition in a vote of no confidence, this group
could bring down the government -- and to show the seriousness of their
threat, they failed to appear at several major legislative votes,
handing Labor a string of easy victories on the Knesset floor.
In exchange for restoring their support to the government, the
nationalists presented Netanyahu with a long list of demands for the
creation of "facts on the ground" throughout the West Bank: construction
of houses and roads for settlers, and demolition of Palestinian homes
declared "illegal"; creation of "territorial continuity" between various
Israeli settlements, and breaking up the continuity between neighboring
Palestinian villages or towns. The main strategic aim of the group was
to preserve and consolidate Israeli rule in the "C" areas, the 70% of
the West Bank still under complete Israeli rule, and prevent any more of
it being handed over to the Palestinians.
In fact, the government has already been taking some steps in this
direction: new construction was authorised in some settlements;
Palestinian land was confiscated; in other cases, confiscations made on
paper in the 1970's and 1980's were now implemented and the land,
hitherto still held by Palestinian villagers, was taken over by
settlers; the demolition of Palestinian houses, suspended after "The
Tunnel Riots" of September 1996, was resumed; Beduins, the weakest and
most marginalised group within Palestinian society, were altogether
evicted from several points -- the case of the Jahalin being the biggest
but not the only one.
These cases of dispossesion, most of them getting no mention in the
Israeli or international media, spelled disaster for the families and
communities involved, and spread feelings of anger and frustration
throughout the Palestinian society -- even while, to outside observers,
the peace process seemed to prosper. But it all fell far short of the
designs of the settlers and their parliamentary allies, who before the
elections expected a Likud governemnt to embark on an extensive,
concerted settlement expansion project.
The nationalist pressure campaign on Netanyahu reached its peak in
February, drawing in larger and larger parts of the fragile ruling
coalition. For several weeks, The PM used delaying tactics, again and
again making solemn promises for settlement extention without doing
anything to implement them. Netanyahu blamed "bureacratic red tape" for
the delays -- but the sceptical hardliners and settlers guessed that the
real reason was Netanyahu's apprehension of the Israeli opposition and
of international pressure.
It was the so-called "Third Way Party", a split-off group of Labor
hawks and one of Netanyahu's coalition partners, which came up with the
idea of focusing on projects falling within "Greater Jerusalem". It was
correctly assumed that the Labor Party opposition would find it
difficult to oppose such projects, which were initiated by Labor
governments in the first place, and in defence of which the government
could cite the magic word "Jerusalem". The move was enthusiastically
endorsed by Jerusalem Mayor Ehud Olmart, a key Netahyahu supporter and a
man facing a corruption trial of his own (in connection with his
handling of funds during his previous job as Likud treasurer) from which
he would like to distract public attention.
Thus was introduced into the center stage of Israeli political life a
name which would all too soon gain worldwide notoriety: Har Homa, the
Bastion Mountain.
To the 2nd part of the Editorial
One hill to far
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