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The following article is extracted from the April 1997 issue of THE OTHER ISRAEL. The publisher encourages unrestricted distribution with acknowledgment of source.

BULLDOZERS OF DEATH

Tel-Aviv, 26.3.97

These words are being written in a country in the midst of a deep crisis, a country mourning innocent victims and waiting anxiously for a bloody confrontation on which its government seems bent. I sit behind the computer in a few calm hours, snatched from the daily effort to organise protests and avert at the last moment the danger into which the Netanyahu Government's criminal folly has brought us. It is now just two months since the Hebron Agreement was signed, amidst a renewed outburst of hope which touched even the more cynical and jaded of us.

Looking back on the past years, one realizes that it is not the first time we have passed through a rapid transition from despair to hope -- and back again. In fact, such transitions seem to be a basic characteristic of a peace process in which so many contradictory and antagonistic forces are held together in an extremely unstable balance, and which nevertheless endured through seemingly hopeless situations. On the other hand, with every passing day it is becoming obvious that this might be the deepest crisis and most dangerous moment since Oslo was signed.

While waiting for the last-ditch mediation effort, I will take the time to recount the main events of the past two months, and try to reconstruct how we got to this point. By the time this issue reaches print, things are likely to have resolved themselve -- for better or for worse.

Looking back

In the middle of January, the long-delayed Hebron Agreement was achieved at the end of five months' arduous Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.

Though the predicted settler revolt against the redeployment did not take place, one serious incident did accompany it: a shooting spree in the Hebron marketplace by Israeli soldier Noam Friedman who was later said to be mentally deranged. On this occasion, the Israeli and Palestinian officers on the ground were able to take quick and coordinated action: to apprehend and disarm Friedman before he could succeed in the random killing of Palestinians; to calm down the angry reactions of the Palestinian population and prevent a serious conflagration. And meanwhile, the Hebron Agreement was ratified by a large majority in the Knesset -- 87 out of 120, far more than was given to any previous Israeli-Palestinian agreement.

The redeployment itself was carried out quickly and smoothly. Israeli forces evacuated some 85% of Hebron, and tens of thousands gave Arafat a tumultous welcome at the former military government headquarters. At the same time, riots broke out in the other part of Hebron, the 15% left under Israeli control -- where 20,000 Palestinians had been condemned to remain under occupation, in order to "safeguard" the armed enclaves housing some 450 religious- nationalist settlers. Thus was exhibited from the very outset the basic instability of the Hebron deal, but at the time it was re- garded as no more than an incident.

The media version of the event followed quite simple lines: that Netanyahu had now formally bound himself to carry on the Oslo peace process; that in token of his intentions he had brought about a military withdrawal from a Palestinian city (or at least from the major part of it); that he further obliged himself to a timetable for three further redeployments of military forces in the West Bank; and that he had done all this with far greater public and parliamentary support than Rabin or Peres ever enjoyed, against only a feeble resistance from the right.

Few people actually read the full text of the Hebron Agreement, with its closely-typed clauses couched in a language comprehensible only to specialists. Still, some of the pitfalls were clearly visible, the most obvious being that the agreement set out the dates of the three stages of military redeployment -- but did not specify the territory to be evacuated. Moreover, Netanyahu claimed for Israel the right to define unilaterally the extent of territory to be evacuated, and though the Americans declared their support for this curious interpretation, the Palestinians most emphatically did not.

Even more problematic, at the end of the third redeployment, due in August 1998, Israel is supposed to withdraw from all parts of the West Bank except for "settlements and specified military locations." But there is absolutely no agreement about the definition of the terms "settlement" and "military location". According to the Israeli interpretation ("settlements: that is also all land earmarked for future expansion", and "military locations includes all present training areas") at least half of the West Bank(!) would fall into one of these categories.

The new peacemaker?

For some weeks, Prime Minister Netanyahu basked in the unaccustomed praise of the international media, which welcomed him without reservations to the Middle East Peacemakers' Club. The Hebron redeployment was a conspicuous TV event, as was the release of the thirty Palestinian women prisoners who had been waiting for this moment since September 1995. (There was hardly any media mention of the still-incarcerated 3,000 male prisoners, including more than 200 Administrative Detainees held without trial, nor was there much attention for the brutal eviction of the Jahalin Bedouins to make place for the extension of the Ma'ale Adumim settlement...)

In yet another media event Netanyahu and Arafat were shown cordially shaking hands in the prestigious International Economic Conference at Davos, Switzerland -- the annual forum where Shimon Peres used to deliver speeches on "The New Middle East."

The Israeli business community started to consider "the new Netanyahu" a fitting successor to Shimon Peres -- whose candidature had been endorsed, less than a year earlier, by such organizations as the Federation of Industrialists and the Chambers of Commerce.

Like Peres, Netanyahu now seemed to combine neo-Liberal economic policies with a drive to open the markets of the Arab World to Israeli goods; the business community enthusiastically supported Netanyahu, both in the Hebron Agreement and in his confrontation with the unions during their one-day general strike.

On January 31, the economic section of Yediot Aharonot bore the headline: "The stagnation is over. Hebron Agreement revived stock market, renews prospects for booming tourist season and warms up trading links with the Arab World". This was accompanied by two photographs: a jubilant Hebron boy, carrying an enormous Palestinian flag -- and a no less jubilant stockbroker in Tel-Aviv, watching on a computer screen the rocketing share prices.

Netanyahu's reputation as a peacemaker was further enhanced by the emergence of an increasingly vocal intransigent nationalist faction within the ruling coalition, led by such figures as Binyamin Begin who resigned his cabinet position in protest against the Hebron Agreement.

With Netanyahu subjected to scathing abuse from the right -- often using the very same terms of vilification which Netanyahu himself had used against the Rabin and Peres governments -- it was quite natural for many peace seekers to start giving credit to this Prime Minister, as they did to Rabin after Oslo. The formerly popular Gush Shalom sticker bearing the slogan 'What have you done today to help bring down the government?' suddenly seemed no so appropriate in demonstrations and events of the Israeli peace movement...

*** * ***

In the aftermath of the Hebron redeployment, the Israeli peace movement at large went through demobilization, with participation in its activities gradually reduced to the activist hardcore. The wider circle of supporters -- those tens of thousands who especially after the Rabin murder used to thong the squares of Tel-Aviv -- went back home. At first, the situation seemed hopeful so why protest about "minor things"; then, within scant weeks, everything had suddenly turned so dark as to seem hopeless.

Was it nothing but a charade? Was the big Netanyahu-Begin struggle, which filled the papers for weeks on end, nothing but a cynical "good cop, bad cop" show put up by con man Netanyahu for our benefit? There were a few peace activists who said so, also at that quiet time a month ago which now seems so distant.

Yet even in the bitter present one can recognise that the Hebron Agreement was indeed a significant change, at least in Netanyahu's own terms and those of his political milieu -- a change from total unwillingness to concede anything at all to the Palestinians into a willingness to give them a little bit (though far too little).

A party which traditionally revered each and every square inch of Biblical "Eretz Yisrael" had come to the conclusion that at least some of these lands must be given up. Moreover, the great majority of Likud members and voters accepted this abandonment of once-sancrosanct principles with surprising ease, to the chagrin of Begin and the other diehards. The "not an inch" principle had been quietly dying during the years of the Intifada and of Oslo, and Netanyahu merely delivered the coup de grace.

Netanyahu's new line took him quite close to the traditional positions of the Labor party, whose leaders ever since 1967 produced various schemes for cutting up the West Bank, annexing considerable parts to Israel while giving over the remainder to some kind of Arab rule. The mood of ambiguity and uncertainty presently prevalent among most of the Israeli population certainly owes much to this blurring of political differences.

Netanyhu's plan, announced semi-officially in an interview to Ma'ariv on March 21, is to divide the West Bank more or less in half between Israel and the Palestinians; the fifty percent given to the Palestinians would lack continuity and consist of several enclaves cut off from each other and from the outside world by settlements and military zones.

For his part Ehud Barak, the man most likely to suceed Shimon Peres as Labor Party leader, outlined several months ago an extensive program of annexations, according to which some thirty to forty percent of the West Bank would be annexed to Israel and the remainder given to the Palestinians. 'The great ideological debate of our generation has been reduced to a question of ten percent of the West Bank' concluded commentator Ben Kaspit of Ma'ariv. This summation, however, leaves outside calculation the standpoint of the Palestinians -- for whom the West Bank and Gaza Strip, territories which in their entirety constitute but 18% of historical Palestine, are but a bare minimum.

The convergence between Likud and Labor positions on the Palestinian issue has made increasingly feasible the option of a "national unity" government embracing both parties -- all the more since their socio-economic policies have been practically identical for over a decade (neo-liberalism somewhat tempered by the presence of "populist" factions in both parties). For Shimon Peres, due to end his tenure as Labor Party leader in June, a portfolio in a national unity government would offer one last chance of entering the corridors of power. He leads the Labor faction which supports the idea of entering the government, in order "to free Netanyhu of pressures from the extreme right"; but the idea is also embraced by many of these same rightwingers -- who understand that such a cabinet, with a broader political base, would have a stronger position against the Palestinians in the remaining stages of negotiations.

Ironically, it is the hawkish Barak -- whose basic positions are not too different from those of Netanyahu -- is steadfastly opposed to "saving a rotten incompetent government which must be brought down."

For his part Yossi Beilin, long considered the most dovish of Labor leaders, now watered down his views in order to produce a joint document with Likud KM Michael Eitan, clearly intended to serve as the unofficial draft program for a Likud-Labor government -- and at considerable variance with the promises which Beilin reportedly made to the Palestinians during the Rabin Government's tenure, of a state comprising some 90% of the West Bank.

*** * ***

From corruption to extremism

For some time, Peres' constant courting of Netanyahu served the Prime Minister well. Rather than actually taking Labor into his cabinet, Netanyahu used the threat of doing so in order to neutralise the pressures of the extreme right; and at the same time, he could rely on a rather mild parliamentary opposition. But this delicate balance was disrupted by a sudden bombshell dropped on the political scene by Ayalah Hasson, star reporter of the Israeli First Channell TV: a corruption scandal involving some of Netanyahu's senior ministers and advisers, and possibly Netanyahu himself.

The report concerned Netanyahu's recent abortive attempt to have one of his loyal supporters -- a lawyer named Roni Bar'on -- appointed to the key position of Attorney-General. The Bar'on candidature had foundered under scathing public criticism -- not only is Bar'on far from a brilliant lawyer, but he was revealed to be involved in large-scale gambling. At the time there was, however, no suspicion that anything beyond a breach of good taste was involved in the affair.

Only several weeks later did the TV reporter come across evidence that Bar'on may have promised -- in return for being appointed -- to help Aryeh Der'i, a prominent religious politician who is undergoing a prolonged corruption trial and still retains a key position as the unquestioned kingmaker of Israeli politics. As head of the country's criminal prosecution, Bar'on would have been in a position to suborn the Der'i trial in various ways. In return, Der'i supposedly promised to have his Shas Party support the Hebron deal. If proven true the affair would constitute, under Israeli law, a criminal conspiracy carrying heavy penalties for all involved.

The reporter, refusing to disclose her source, could not provide evidence which would stand in court. Nevertheless, Netanyahu had no choice but to approve the appointment of a Special Police Investigating Team with wide powers. The affair quickly snowballed, with Justice Minister Hanegbi being subjected to prolonged police interrogation -- followed by none other than Netanyahu himself, the first Israeli Prime Minister to undergo such humiliation. In the press, comparisons were frequently made with Watergate and the ignominious end of the Nixon Presidency.

With the downfall of the Netanyahu Govenment suddenly seeming a very concrete possibility, the idea of Labor joining the cabinet was momentarily shelved, as the party leaders fell into sweet dreams of ousting Netanyahu altogether. And with the government under constant attack from that direction, an enormously strong bargaining position was handed to the parliamentary ultra- nationalists, now officially organised in the "Eretz Yisrael Front" which included no less than seventeen out of the sixty-six Knesset Members on whose support Netanyahu relies.

By joining with the opposition in a vote of no confidence, this group could bring down the government -- and to show the seriousness of their threat, they failed to appear at several major legislative votes, handing Labor a string of easy victories on the Knesset floor.

In exchange for restoring their support to the government, the nationalists presented Netanyahu with a long list of demands for the creation of "facts on the ground" throughout the West Bank: construction of houses and roads for settlers, and demolition of Palestinian homes declared "illegal"; creation of "territorial continuity" between various Israeli settlements, and breaking up the continuity between neighboring Palestinian villages or towns. The main strategic aim of the group was to preserve and consolidate Israeli rule in the "C" areas, the 70% of the West Bank still under complete Israeli rule, and prevent any more of it being handed over to the Palestinians.

In fact, the government has already been taking some steps in this direction: new construction was authorised in some settlements; Palestinian land was confiscated; in other cases, confiscations made on paper in the 1970's and 1980's were now implemented and the land, hitherto still held by Palestinian villagers, was taken over by settlers; the demolition of Palestinian houses, suspended after "The Tunnel Riots" of September 1996, was resumed; Beduins, the weakest and most marginalised group within Palestinian society, were altogether evicted from several points -- the case of the Jahalin being the biggest but not the only one.

These cases of dispossesion, most of them getting no mention in the Israeli or international media, spelled disaster for the families and communities involved, and spread feelings of anger and frustration throughout the Palestinian society -- even while, to outside observers, the peace process seemed to prosper. But it all fell far short of the designs of the settlers and their parliamentary allies, who before the elections expected a Likud governemnt to embark on an extensive, concerted settlement expansion project.

The nationalist pressure campaign on Netanyahu reached its peak in February, drawing in larger and larger parts of the fragile ruling coalition. For several weeks, The PM used delaying tactics, again and again making solemn promises for settlement extention without doing anything to implement them. Netanyahu blamed "bureacratic red tape" for the delays -- but the sceptical hardliners and settlers guessed that the real reason was Netanyahu's apprehension of the Israeli opposition and of international pressure.

It was the so-called "Third Way Party", a split-off group of Labor hawks and one of Netanyahu's coalition partners, which came up with the idea of focusing on projects falling within "Greater Jerusalem". It was correctly assumed that the Labor Party opposition would find it difficult to oppose such projects, which were initiated by Labor governments in the first place, and in defence of which the government could cite the magic word "Jerusalem". The move was enthusiastically endorsed by Jerusalem Mayor Ehud Olmart, a key Netahyahu supporter and a man facing a corruption trial of his own (in connection with his handling of funds during his previous job as Likud treasurer) from which he would like to distract public attention.

Thus was introduced into the center stage of Israeli political life a name which would all too soon gain worldwide notoriety: Har Homa, the Bastion Mountain.

To the 2nd part of the Editorial
One hill to far

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