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The commando unit is not an
army unit like any other. It is a frame of mind, a disposition, a way of
looking at the world.
During the 1948 war I served in
Samson's Foxes company which was, together with the Negev Animals, the
mother of all Israeli army commando units. I know what I am talking
about, because at the time I became infected with some of these traits
myself. It wasn't easy to get rid of them.
The commando is a "select" unit and
its members are very aware of this. In order to prepare them for
especially dangerous missions, they are instilled with the belief that
they are the best, the most courageous; each one special. They are
imbued with contempt for all other soldiers. "It's us and nobody else."
This feeling of superiority brings
with it a contempt for law and order. A commando will not be caught
properly dressed, he will always take care to look a bit disheveled.
Rules which apply to ordinary soldiers - the chain of command, outward
(as distinct from "inner") discipline, parade-ground drill and other
such "bullshit" - are not for him. The word bullshit is used in its
original version, as is the word "bardak", meaning bordello - a general
state of blessed disorder.
Daring, initiative and
resourcefulness are essential commando attributes, as is the other side
of the coin - arrogance and smugness.
More important than these personal
traits are the operational ones. The commando exists for special
operations, often behind enemy lines. Therefore, the commando operates
in small units able to move quickly, to surprise the enemy from an
unexpected direction, to achieve the objective and get out. The commando
is not designed to hold on to a conquered position, but rather to clear
out quickly, before the opponent has time to counterattack. To kill, to
confirm the killing, to scram.
The term "commando", in this sense,
is derived from the Dutch. It originated at the time of the Boer Wars
(Boer is Dutch for farmer) when the regular British army fought against
the Dutch settlers in South Africa, who formed small local militias and
called them "commandos". These were extremely mobile units, they knew
the countryside well and were able to surprise the cumbersome British
battalions.
The British learned their lesson
and in World War II they set up their own commandos. Jews from Palestine
(my brother among them fought in one of them, the Middle East Commando.
The commandos were employed in hit-and-run operations, which were not
uniformly successful.
The way of thinking of a commando
chief (like Ariel Sharon, chief of Unit 101) is quite different from
that of a general commanding a mass of armor and infantry (like Israel
Tal, the tank expert). The general has to move large forces, coordinate
between commanders with huge egos, safeguard occupied territory, plan
supplies and keep allies in line. His perceptions of space, time and
forces are quite alien to a commando chief. A commando, on the other
hand, has no strategic perception, he deals only with short-term
tactics. Barak, for example. put on women's clothes, landed in Beirut,
killed Palestinian leaders and got out. On another occasion, he donned
white overalls, entered the Sabena airplane (at Tel Aviv airport),
killed the kidnappers. Finis.
Therefore, it is nearly impossible
for a commando officer to become the chief-of-staff in a normal army.
But in Israel, the opposite is true: Nearly all recent chiefs-of-staff
have come from the commandos. In the political arena, the situation is
even stranger: In no other Western democracy are there so many generals
in the Government and in other senior positions. In Israel, the last two
Prime Ministers were former commando officers.
Barak conducts a commando policy.
On the positive side, he has a lot of daring, originality and
resourcefulness. On the negative side, he has a lot of arrogance and
pomposity that tells him that he knows everything better than anybody
else, an abysmal contempt for his colleagues and an inability to set up
an orderly administration, to coordinate between colleagues and to
delegate responsibility. All these are typical commando traits.
He conducts a hit-and-run policy:
negotiations with the Syrians approach the last stage and then - sudden
disengagement and quick retreat; negotiations with the Palestinians
approach the final stage - and the same all over again. The same is
going to happen to the "civil" and/or "secular" and/or "social"
revolution. Everything is tactics; nothing is strategy. All are daring
hit-and-run raids, none of them well-planned actions designed to achieve
an objective and hold on to it.
"Use tricks in making war," says
the Book of Proverbs (in its original Hebrew version). It does not
advise using tricks to make peace.
I wouldn't have believed it possible.
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