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bitterlemons-international.org
Middle East Roundtable /
Edition 31
A Palestinian View:
National Unity?
by Ghassan Khatib Before the
June 25 capture of an Israeli soldier in the Gaza Strip, the Hamas-led
government was facing a number of severe difficulties as a result of lack of
experience and the Israeli and international boycott of that government.
These difficulties, compounded by the fact that all rival parties, including
Fateh and the PLO factions, were outside the government creating a
relatively strong opposition, had started to produce the beginnings of
public criticism of the government.
For these and other reasons, the ground was being prepared for a possible
national unity government. After June 25, however, and with the Israeli
campaign of violence against Gaza as well as the arrest of most Hamas
Cabinet members and parliamentarians in the West Bank, these efforts froze.
Within Hamas now, the debate seems to be focused on whether or not to link
negotiations on the captured Israeli soldier in Gaza with what Hizballah
might be doing regarding the two Israeli soldiers captured on the
Lebanon-Israel border.
Most Hamas members in Gaza do not seem enthusiastic about such a linkage and
prefer a deal that would involve a release of Palestinian prisoners and an
end to the Israeli violence against Gaza in return for the release of the
Israeli soldier held in Gaza and an end to the rocket launching at southern
Israel.
Should such a deal materialize--and strenuous efforts to this effect are
being undertaken by Egypt and the presidency of the Palestinian
Authority--the possibility of a national unity coalition government might
emerge again.
There are two views within Hamas on such an eventuality. There are those who
still take seriously their task as a government and believe that a coalition
government has a better chance of survival and consequently of sustaining
Hamas' victory in parliamentary elections in January.
This strand of thought also holds that a coalition government will be better
able to confront and end the international boycott and might also help
convince Israel to stop withholding the taxes it collects on behalf of the
PA, monies that constitute one-third to a half of the PA's salary bill.
Indeed, the transfer of that money might also be a condition in any deal
with Israel over the captured Israeli soldier.
However, there have been no encouraging signals from Israel or the
international community to indicate that support of the PA can resume should
a national unity government emerge. This is in spite of suggestions that any
such government will have a technocrat prime minister rather than a Hamas
premier or even that President Mahmoud Abbas would himself play that role.
The lack of such signals is being used as an argument by the other strand of
thought on the issue within Hamas. This strand holds that a pure
Hamas-government should continue because no matter how flexible and
forthcoming on this issue Hamas is, there is little that can be expected in
terms of flexibility in the attitude of the donor community and Israel.
Nevertheless, any prisoner exchange deal with Israel is likely to be
followed by at least a government reshuffle. That might coincide with a
change either in the composition of the Israeli government or a change in
its attitude and position vis-a-vis the Palestinian issue.
One of the conclusions that Israel is invited to draw from its crises with
both Hamas in Palestine and Hizballah in Lebanon is that relying only on
military superiority and the use of force will not be enough to ensure the
safety, security and survival of Israel. No matter how strong Israel is, the
continuing injustice it inflicts on its neighbors and the lack of any
peaceful political prospect for co-existence--the sum total of the
Palestinian experience of negotiations for a historic compromise based on
the exchange of land for peace--will always give rise to resistance.
That's why, logically, it should be expected from either a new post-conflict
Israeli government or the existing government to move toward a political
process. Without such a process, Israel cannot hope to defuse the growing
hostility among Israel's neighbors that has resulted from Israeli arrogance,
the disproportionate use of force and a total neglect of the basic needs and
rights of the other side.- Published 7/8/2006 © bitterlemons.org
Ghassan Khatib is coeditor of the bitterlemons family of internet
publications. He is the former Palestinian Authority minister of planning,
and has been a political analyst and media contact for many years.
Bitterlemons-international.org is an internet
forum for an array of world perspectives on the Middle East and its
specific concerns. It aspires to engender greater understanding about
the Middle East region and open a new common space for world thinkers
and political leaders to present their viewpoints and initiatives on the
region. Editors Ghassan Khatib and Yossi Alpher can be reached at
ghassan@bitterlemons-international.org
and
yossi@bitterlemons-international.org, respectively.
hagalil.com 15-08-2006 |
