bitterlemons-international.org
Middle East Roundtable /
Edition 31
An Israeli View:
New Political Realities
by Yossi Alpher
Once this war is over on both the Lebanese
and Gazan fronts, we can expect a period of flux in the fortunes and
direction of the governments of Israel and the Palestinian Authority. What
follows is of necessity a speculative assessment as to where that may lead.
In Israel, public and political criticism will be leveled at
the Olmert government over its handling of the war, and particularly its
hasty decision to respond to the Hizballah attack on July 12 with an all-out
offensive and its acquiescence in the IDF's over-confident plan to rely
almost entirely on air power. Its handling of contacts and negotiations
regarding a ceasefire and deployment of an international force in southern
Lebanon may also come in for heavy criticism, depending on their outcome. If
there seems any likelihood that Israeli troops will remain in South Lebanon
for an indeterminate time, public anger at the government could grow. While
the Knesset will remain on summer vacation until mid-October, opposition
politicians from the right and the left could try to convene it for a vote
of no-confidence.
A lot of criticism will focus on the army, its degree of preparedness for
the war in terms of both intelligence and operations, and the growing
dominance of the Israel Air Force in the IDF's most senior ranks. It will be
hard to blame the government for these alleged lacunae, given that it had
not served even 100 days when the war began. On the other hand, the near
total lack of national security decision-making experience at the highest
levels of the Olmert government, including the prime minister himself, will
undoubtedly draw criticism, including from within Kadima and its primary
coalition partner, Labor. Certainly, in the aftermath of a war fought across
two internationally-recognized boundaries to which Israel had withdrawn
unilaterally, any attempt by Olmert to proceed with plans for "convergence"
or further unilateral disengagement on the West Bank could jeopardize the
stability of his government.
One additional factor that could either weaken or energize the Olmert
government after the war might be new local or international initiatives
concerning Lebanon, Syria and/or Palestine that seek to exploit the war and
the surrounding regional crisis to leverage new peace departures. PM
Olmert's response to such initiatives, and the attitude of the Israeli
public, could be crucial for the stability of his government in the months
to come. Given the likely opposition to another unilateral disengagement in
the near future, Olmert would be wise to weigh carefully the possibility of
engaging in some sort of peace process if the opportunity arises.
Turning to the Palestinian Authority, speculation centers on the likelihood
that the current Hamas government will be replaced after the war in Gaza by
a Hamas-Fateh unity cabinet, catalyzed by the Prisoners' Document the two
sides have reportedly agreed on. Depending on its composition and its
guidelines, such a government might be better able to interact with the
international community, receive aid and possibly even dialogue with Israel
at the economic and political levels. Here, too, a lot depends on the way
the war in Gaza ends and the possibility of new initiatives emanating from
the international community. If, for example, Syria is successfully co-opted
into a renewed political process, this might help soften up Hamas' hard line
positions on some issues.
Here it behooves us to recall the Israeli-Palestinian agenda prior to the
war. Olmert was about to meet with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu
Mazen). According to both Abu Mazen and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak,
Olmert intended to release a considerable number of Palestinian
prisoners--women, minors and the aged--as a goodwill gesture. He then
planned to explore with Abu Mazen various possibilities for a peace process.
At the time, it appeared that little would come of these meetings, thereby
clearing the decks for Olmert's convergence plan.
Now Olmert may feel obliged to shelve his convergence plan. In a best case
scenario, Abu Mazen's status might be strengthened by the presence of Fateh
representatives in the PA government, while developments to Israel's north
might include some sort of political process with Lebanon and/or Syria. This
could bespeak a new political reality for Israelis and Palestinians--though
how different, and in what direction it might lead, are for the moment
matters strictly for speculation. Nor is a post-war worst case scenario
beyond the realm of speculation: ongoing border tensions with Hamas and
Hizballah, and unstable governments in both Israel and Palestine.-
Published 7/8/2006 © bitterlemons.org
Yossi Alpher is coeditor of the bitterlemons family of internet
publications. He is former director of the Jaffee Center for Strategic
Studies at Tel Aviv University and a former senior adviser to PM Ehud Barak.
Bitterlemons-international.org is an internet
forum for an array of world perspectives on the Middle East and its
specific concerns. It aspires to engender greater understanding about
the Middle East region and open a new common space for world thinkers
and political leaders to present their viewpoints and initiatives on the
region. Editors Ghassan Khatib and Yossi Alpher can be reached at
ghassan@bitterlemons-international.org
and
yossi@bitterlemons-international.org, respectively.
hagalil.com 15-08-2006 |