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bitterlemons-international.org
Middle East Roundtable /
Edition 13
An Israeli View:
The ultimate mission is Islamization
by Yossi Alpher
[DEUTSCH]
Hamas is moving steadily toward establishing a cabinet
based entirely on its adherents and its religious-political philosophy.
Within days that cabinet may well be in place. In parallel, the nature and
composition of the next Israeli government will begin to emerge following
elections on March 28. Thus, some of the main consequences of the Hamas
victory in the Palestinian Authority elections of January 25 are beginning
to fall into place. For one,
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) appears to be steadily
backpedaling and yielding to Hamas. He began by presenting a set of
impressive conditions for Hamas to qualify to form a government, and sought
to postpone the establishment of that government until well after Israel's
elections. The "dinosaurs" of the anachronistic PLO leadership weighed in
with their conditions. Hamas has responded by ignoring them all, and is
seeking immediate parliamentary approval for its cabinet. Now Abu Mazen
promises (threatens?) to monitor the new government's performance closely
and intervene (disband the government? hold new elections?) if it does not
perform to his standards concerning Israel and a peace process. Let's not
hold our breath on this one; Abu Mazen's commitments and conditions, which
are impressive when viewed out of context, ceased long ago to be credible.
By the same token, there is little chance of a renewed peace process, or
roadmap process or even serious negotiations in the coming months. The
Israeli left, if it joins a coalition with Kadima, will try to hold that
party to its promise to at least explore the possibility of negotiating
before applying itself to disengagement, hereinafter known as "convergence".
But Abu Mazen's performance truly does not inspire confidence that a PLO
peace track can somehow bypass Hamas and the PA and save Israel from
reliance on more disengagement.
Abu Mazen is also reportedly seeking to involve the Arab League, which meets
this week in Khartoum, on his side. The idea appears to be to confront Hamas
with a reaffirmation of the Saudi plan, approved by the League in March
2002. Back then the Sharon government dismissed the plan out of hand, when
in fact it should have welcomed it--problematic as it is from the Israeli
standpoint--as a step forward by the Arab community toward a comprehensive
peace. Now, even in the best case, the plan will not bring Hamas to the
negotiating table. Still, Arab League pressure on Hamas to align its
policies with the Saudi plan cannot hurt.
Meanwhile the ceasefire, or lull (tahdiya) appears likely to continue for at
least a few months, as Hamas strives to stabilize its rule and Ehud Olmert
organizes a coalition. In this regard, the immediate question is, how will
Hamas behave toward those Palestinian actors--Islamic Jihad, Fateh
dissidents, PFLP--who don't recognize the ceasefire and seek to sabotage,
first, Israel's elections, and then the ceasefire itself. A refusal on the
part of a Hamas minister of internal security to act against these
terrorists could considerably shorten the span of Israeli patience toward a
Hamas government. Yet this is almost certainly what will happen.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly for the long term prospects of
either moderating Hamas or removing it from power, the new government will,
beginning this week, confront the domestic challenge of managing and funding
government activities. It will presumably tackle this issue energetically,
launching laudable anti-corruption and self-sufficiency programs, finding
subterfuges for international donor funds and Israeli-collected taxes to be
delivered indirectly via NGOs, and calling upon a variety of Arab and
Islamic donors to increase their support. But it will have to use caution in
firing the tens of thousands of Fateh-supporters who draw inflated salaries
without working, lest it confront mutiny.
In dealing with Hamas' performance, Israel, the moderate Arab states and the
international community, led by the US and the EU, should keep in mind three
factors. First, there is no precedent for the Muslim Brotherhood taking
power by elections in an Arab country. We simply cannot know for sure how
Hamas will behave. Hence caution is indicated in the early days: watch and
wait; use both carrots and sticks.
Second, everything we know about Israeli-Palestinian interaction tells us
that economic sanctions that further impoverish Palestinians will not have
the desired effect of moderating Hamas. To the contrary, they will further
radicalize Palestinian society. This is not to say that we should throw
money at a Hamas government, or that international donor aid will moderate
it. Certainly there is no reason to reward Hamas for its extremist,
anti-peace positions. But it makes little sense to punish Palestinians for
them, either.
Finally, we must constantly remind ourselves that, at the end of the day,
and no matter how long it takes and how cautiously it goes about it, Hamas
has a single, overriding mission: Islamization of Palestinian society. Those
in Palestine, Israel and beyond who ignore this factor are liable to pay a
heavy price for their willful ignorance.- Published 27/3/2006 ©
bitterlemons.org
Yossi Alpher is coeditor of the bitterlemons family of internet
publications. He is former director of the Jaffee Center for Strategic
Studies at Tel Aviv University and a former senior adviser to PM Ehud Barak.
[DEUTSCH]
Bitterlemons-international.org is an internet
forum for an array of world perspectives on the Middle East and its
specific concerns. It aspires to engender greater understanding about
the Middle East region and open a new common space for world thinkers
and political leaders to present their viewpoints and initiatives on the
region. Editors Ghassan Khatib and Yossi Alpher can be reached at
ghassan@bitterlemons-international.org
and
yossi@bitterlemons-international.org, respectively.
hagalil.com 03-04-2006 |
