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The commando unit is not an
army unit like any other. It is a frame of mind, a disposition, a way of
looking at the world.
During the 1948 war I served in
Samson's Foxes company which was, together with the Negev Animals, the
mother of all Israeli army commando units. I know what I am talking about,
because at the time I became infected with some of these traits myself. It
wasn't easy to get rid of them.
The commando is a "select" unit and
its members are very aware of this. In order to prepare them for
especially dangerous missions, they are instilled with the belief that
they are the best, the most courageous; each one special. They are imbued
with contempt for all other soldiers. "It's us and nobody else."
This feeling of superiority brings
with it a contempt for law and order. A commando will not be caught
properly dressed, he will always take care to look a bit disheveled. Rules
which apply to ordinary soldiers - the chain of command, outward (as
distinct from "inner") discipline, parade-ground drill and other such
"bullshit" - are not for him. The word bullshit is used in its original
version, as is the word "bardak", meaning bordello - a general state of
blessed disorder.
Daring, initiative and
resourcefulness are essential commando attributes, as is the other side of
the coin - arrogance and smugness.
More important than these personal
traits are the operational ones. The commando exists for special
operations, often behind enemy lines. Therefore, the commando operates in
small units able to move quickly, to surprise the enemy from an unexpected
direction, to achieve the objective and get out. The commando is not
designed to hold on to a conquered position, but rather to clear out
quickly, before the opponent has time to counterattack. To kill, to
confirm the killing, to scram.
The term "commando", in this sense,
is derived from the Dutch. It originated at the time of the Boer Wars
(Boer is Dutch for farmer) when the regular British army fought against
the Dutch settlers in South Africa, who formed small local militias and
called them "commandos". These were extremely mobile units, they knew the
countryside well and were able to surprise the cumbersome British
battalions.
The British learned their lesson
and in World War II they set up their own commandos. Jews from Palestine
(my brother among them fought in one of them, the Middle East Commando.
The commandos were employed in hit-and-run operations, which were not
uniformly successful.
The way of thinking of a commando
chief (like Ariel Sharon, chief of Unit 101) is quite different from that
of a general commanding a mass of armor and infantry (like Israel Tal, the
tank expert). The general has to move large forces, coordinate between
commanders with huge egos, safeguard occupied territory, plan supplies and
keep allies in line. His perceptions of space, time and forces are quite
alien to a commando chief. A commando, on the other hand, has no strategic
perception, he deals only with short-term tactics. Barak, for example. put
on women's clothes, landed in Beirut, killed Palestinian leaders and got
out. On another occasion, he donned white overalls, entered the Sabena
airplane (at Tel Aviv airport), killed the kidnappers. Finis.
Therefore, it is nearly impossible
for a commando officer to become the chief-of-staff in a normal army. But
in Israel, the opposite is true: Nearly all recent chiefs-of-staff have
come from the commandos. In the political arena, the situation is even
stranger: In no other Western democracy are there so many generals in the
Government and in other senior positions. In Israel, the last two Prime
Ministers were former commando officers.
Barak conducts a commando policy.
On the positive side, he has a lot of daring, originality and
resourcefulness. On the negative side, he has a lot of arrogance and
pomposity that tells him that he knows everything better than anybody
else, an abysmal contempt for his colleagues and an inability to set up an
orderly administration, to coordinate between colleagues and to delegate
responsibility. All these are typical commando traits.
He conducts a hit-and-run policy:
negotiations with the Syrians approach the last stage and then - sudden
disengagement and quick retreat; negotiations with the Palestinians
approach the final stage - and the same all over again. The same is going
to happen to the "civil" and/or "secular" and/or "social" revolution.
Everything is tactics; nothing is strategy. All are daring hit-and-run
raids, none of them well-planned actions designed to achieve an objective
and hold on to it.
"Use tricks in making war," says
the Book of Proverbs (in its original Hebrew version). It does not advise
using tricks to make peace.
I wouldn't have believed it possible.
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