A film about Rabin without Oslo
is like a film about Albert Einstein without the theory of relativity or
about Ben Gurion without the foundation of the State of Israel. It’s like
murdering Rabin all over again.
There is no Rabin
without Oslo, as there is no Oslo without Rabin. For 25 years he walked,
step by step, towards this destination, which became his destiny. I can
contribute a personal testimony to this.
Apart from some
incidental encounters, I've had no contacts with Rabin until the June 1967
war. Then I sent several secret letters to the Chief-of-Staff Rabin,
drawing his attention to a war crime committed by his soldiers: the
wholesale killing of poor Palestinian refugees trying to cross the Jordan
at night in order to get home. He acknowledged receipt of the letters,
and, as far as I know, the practice stopped.
In the spring of
1969, after Prime Minister Levy Eshkol died in office, and in my role as
the head of a Knesset fraction, I officially proposed to the President of
the State that Rabin be entrusted with the job of forming a new
government. This would have necessitated a change of the law. Shortly
thereafter, in June, I visited ambassador Rabin at his embassy in
Washington, and that was the beginning of a dialogue about the
Israeli-Palestinian problem which continued until his death.
Rak Gwul patuach - Gwul batuach
I had come to the
United States in order to propagate the idea of a Palestinian State in the
occupied territories – an idea that I had already proposed to Eshkol in
the middle of the 1967 war. After I had talked to several high-ranking
American officials (i.a. Sisco, Saunders, Yost), Rabin invited me to the
embassy. During our conversation he uttered a memorable sentence: "I don’t
care at all where the borders will be, as long as they are open. Only an
open border is a safe border." (In Hebrew, open is patuah, safe is
batuah.)
He adhered,
however, to the so-called "Jordanian option". During the conversation, and
later in a summing-up letter I wrote him, I tried to convince him that
only a border between the State of Israel and a State of Palestine would
be unavoidably open. It would be open by necessity, by the economic,
political and geographical reality, such as the connection between the
West Bank and Gaza.
After Rabin’s
return home the dialogue continued off and on – in the Prime Minister’s
office, the Knesset, his residence, his private home and at social events
where we would bump into each other and drink whiskey together. During
1975 and 1976 I came to his office several times in order to report, at
the request of the Palestinians, about my secret contacts with PLO
leaders. I brought him several proposals by Yasser Arafat (transmitted via
Sa’id Hamami and myself) for a progression of certain political steps.
Rabin repeated his belief in the Jordanian option and uttered another
sentence that stuck in my memory: "I shall not take any step towards the
Palestinians, because the first step will put us on a road that will
inevitably lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state." To this he
objected.
So how did he get
to Oslo? He himself explained this to me in 1994, in a Shabbat
conversation in his home. I had come to talk with him in preparation of
the writing of an article in which I was going to name him Man of the
Year. I had never seen him in such a relaxed mood. Lea was sitting with
some guests in the living room, Rabin received me in his study. Eytan
Haber joined us.
Rabin told me that
he had adhered to the Jordanian option until the Intifada, when King
Hussein announced that he was leaving the game and was giving up any claim
to the West Bank. Even earlier, Ariel Sharon had tried to set up a group
of Palestinian Quislings (the "Village Leagues"), which aroused only
ridicule among the Palestinians. When Rabin was appointed Minister of
Defense, he invited local Palestinian leaders to meet him, individually
and in groups. All told him: "As long as we are under occupation, we
cannot conduct negotiations. Our political address is the PLO in Tunis."
Afterwards the
Prime Minister, Yitzhaq Shamir, was compelled to attend a peace conference
in Madrid. He refused, of course, to sit down with a Palestinian
delegation. Therefore a joint "Jordanian-Palestinian" delegation was
formed - but it soon split into two. Thus the Israeli delegation found
itself opposite a Palestinian delegation. Faisal Husseini, its leader, was
a resident of Jerusalem, and therefore was not allowed into the room. He
gave his orders to the delegation in the next one.
The situation
became ridiculous. Every time the Israelis proposed something, the
Palestinians said: "Let’s take a break. We must place a call to Tunis and
get Arafat’s answer." Rabin drew the logical conclusion: If it is Arafat
who makes all the decisions in any case, it would be better to talk with
him directly."(In order to foreclose any doubt, I should mention that I
have published all these facts in my book "My Friend, the Enemy" while
Rabin was still alive. and that he never denied any of it.)
When he agreed to
the Oslo principles, Rabin was not ready to make the big leap to reach
peace directly. He was slow and cautious by nature and, in
contradistinction to Begin, he was averse to dramatic moves. Instead of
immediately paying the whole price for the whole peace, which would be a
Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, and the pre-1967
border the settlers turned back, he preferred to move forward slowly. He
wanted to progress step by step, although he understood that this would
lead eventually to the Palestinian state (as described).
Already in the 70s
I had proposed that he meet Arafat secretly. At the time he adamantly
refused. Even when he shook the hand of Arafat in Washington, it was
obvious that he had to overcome misgivings. But during the two years left
to him, the relations became much closer. The real Arafat, whom one sees
in a face to face encounter, is very different from the one Israelis see
in their imagination. Rabin, who was rather suspicious of personal
relationships and not prone to bond easily, came to respect and trust the
Palestinian leader, as Lea has testified.
We did not come to an empty country
Rabin underwent an
even deeper change: he began to see the Palestinian side of the historic
narrative and to absorb the fact that not all the justice is on one side.
It was a slow and profound process. In his last Knesset speech he said:
"We did not come to an empty country." This is quite a heretical sentence
coming from a convinced Zionist. Rabin’s assassin, and those who stood
behind him, realized that they had no time to lose.
Those who pretend
now to be his heirs are very far from being so. Ehud Barak has succeeded,
within days, in destroying all that Rabin had built, patiently and
thoroughly over the period of years. Barak did not continue where Rabin
had left off, but returned us all to square one.
The similarity
between Barak and Rabin is very superficial – both were born in this
country, both were professional soldiers and both became Chiefs-of-Staff.
But Rabin was much more than a general. He was an honest and wise person
with a moral backbone. He was not arrogant. He did not believe that one
can compel the Palestinians by force to accept things that threaten their
national existence.
He understood that
if one wants to reach the "end of the conflict" with one stroke, one has
to pay the whole price; and that, if one is not yet ready for this, it is
better to proceed with interim agreements. He did not look down on the
Palestinians and their leader.
In order to make peace with the Arabs,
one does not have to speak Arabic.
On has to be a human being.
Ezer Weizman once
said to me: "In order to make peace with the Arabs, one does not have to
speak Arabic. On has to be a human being." Rabin was no saint and no
genius. But he was a human being.
Ein früherer
Artikel zum Thema (in german):
Wie kam Jizhak Rabin nach Oslo?
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Hebrew
ua / hagalil.com /
05-11-2000 |