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The following article is extracted from the July-August 1997 issue of THE OTHER ISRAEL

Diplomatic duels - Facts on the ground - Pulling the purse strings
Alliance and counter-alliance - Scandals and crises - A fractured society - Deadly deadlock

Diplomatic duels

Even in the best scenario imaginable, an all-out military confrontation between Israel and the Palestinians would still cause untold suffering to the Palestinian population. Rather than running into that hazardous last option, the Palestinian leadership sought to try all other avenues at its disposal, political and diplomatic.

Palestinian leaders appealed directly to the Israeli public opinion and gave a considerable number of interviews to the Israeli press and electronic media, trying to convey a sense of the mounting Palestinian anger and frustration. They repeatedly met with all kinds of Israelis: not only with peace activists but also with business people, with opposition Knesset Members, and even with a few relatively moderate members of Netanyahu's ruling coalition. There was also a series of Palestinian meetings with Israeli President Weitzman, whose office has only a titular function but who managed to build up a considerable personal moral authority. These intensive Palestinian activities may have helped drive home to Netanyahu that in case of a head-on armed confrontation he would not have a united Israeli society behind him -- but this was not enough to force a change in Netanyahu's basic policies.

Arafat and his team also made the most of their advantage in various international forums -- notably the U.N. Assembly General, where there is no U.S. veto. True, its resolutions are not binding, and in order to gain the adherence of the Europeans the Palestinians always needed to somewhat water down their positions. Still, it was a repeated humiliation for Netanyahu to be again and again thrust into diplomatic isolation, having at his side -- except for the United States -- only the small pacific island nation of Micronesia. Overnight a sticker was produced which was soon seen on walls all over the country: Bibi, off to Micronesia!

Yet as long as he had the world's sole remaining superpower solidly on his side, Netanyahu could afford to brush all this aside as no more than an inconvenience. At the beginning of the Har Homa Crisis, U.S. Envoy Denis Ross did make a short and ineffective effort at mediation. President Clinton seemed unable or unwilling to provide Ross with real clout, or to send a more senior representative to the Middle East. While continuing to express verbal opposition to Har Homa, the president not only failed to put any pressure on Netanyahu, but even tried to prevent the Europeans and the Arab states from doing so*.

* According to Akiva Eldar of Ha'aretz, known for his expertise in Washington affairs, Secretary of State Albright did support a more assertive policy towards Netanyahu, but her position was counter-balanced by Vice President Gore -- who reportedly hopes to get for the 2000 Presidential Race the support of some of the same rich Americans who supported the Netanyahu campaign in 1996.

The Palestinians felt angry at what they regarded as a biased US attitude, but still went along with the American mediation initiative -- which, however, soon petered out without achieving anything. Later, they cooperated with the European and Egyptian initiatives, which met with no better success. Arafat and his aides held countless and fruitless meetings with the successive Special Envoys, and occasionally agreed to hold under these envoys' auspices talks about the resumption of talks with the representatives of Netanyahu.

Each initiative invariably broke up against the immovable rock of Har Homa. At one point, the Egyptians suggested a six month "pause" at Har Homa, during which period intensive "definite solution" negotiations would be held. The maximum Netanyahu would agree to was a "pause" of five days, which included a weekend and a Jewish holiday when work would have been halted anyway...

The Editors

THE OTHER ISRAEL is the newsletter of the Israeli Council for Israeli-Palestinian Peace

P.O.Box 2542
58125 Holon
Israel.

Phone/Fax: (03) 5565804

Editor: Adam Keller
Coeditor: Beate Zilversmidt

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