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A
BINATIONAL STATE? GOD FORBID!
Uri Avnery Journal of
Palestine Studies
(An answer to an essay by Azmi Bishara in the same journal.)
When I come to
contradict the theses of my friend Azmi, I am conscious of a certain
irony. While Bishara, a Palestinian, albeit a citizen of Israel and
indeed a self-declared candidate for the Prime Ministership of this
state, mercilessly attacks Yassir Arafat and his strategy, I, an
Israeli, albeit an old friend of the Palestinian cause, support them
wholeheartedly. It looks like a battle with reversed fronts. I have no
quarrel with most of Bishara’s analysis. Indeed, great parts of it
run parallel to my own articles on the situation. My quarrel is with his
conclusion. Mine are diametrically opposed to his. His description of
the Israeli-Palestinian-American minuet at each stage of the
negotiations is exactly right, except in one little detail: after each
of these frustrating forth-and-back movements, something remains in
Palestinian hands. Perhaps little, but little is much more than nothing,
when the life of a nation is at stake.
Bishara has a lot of
contempt for such little gains. Not I. Throughout the 20th century, this
was a major tactical difference between the two national movements
fighting each other in Palestine. The Zionists, when offered something,
always accepted and immediately worked for more. The Palestinians always
rejected, because it was not enough. History has proved the Zionists
right. Their slogan „dunam after dunam, goat after goat“ led
to victory, while the maximalist (Everything or Nothing) approach of all
Palestinian leaders – until Arafat -- led to much more then
defeat. It brought about a historic tragedy for the Palestinians. The
result is the very same "imbalance of power" which Bishara bemoans now.
Israel has an overwhelming superiority on all fronts, military,
political, economic. It has at its disposal all the means of a modern
state. There is no way of changing this imbalance dramatically. All
Palestinian policy is necessarily being conducted within the framework
of this situation, while striving to overcome it. Wishing it away is of
no avail. What is needed is a strategy that will achieve partial gains
and consolidate them, while fighting for more.
Arafat has created such
a policy and adhered to it with remarkable tenacity. He has achieved
outstanding results. Forty years ago, when Fatah was founded, there was
no Palestine on the map, even the existence of a Palestinian people was
denied. Those few (including myself), who advocated in the 50s the
creation of a Palestinian state, were ridiculed. Today, an important
part of the Palestinian people lives under an internationally recognized
Palestinian self-government, whose many obvious faults are insignificant
-- and hopefully temporary – compared to the fact of its very
existence, as an embryo of a full-fledged state. The sole remaining
superpower, which has been for decades a sworn enemy of Palestinian
aspirations, has become remarkably more even-handed, Europe has become
friendly.
This is not an ideal
situation. Far from it. But compared to the starting point of this long
march, a tremendous advance has been achieved. Certainly, this is not
the work of one person; many worked, fought and died for it. But nobody
can really deny the outstanding leadership of Arafat, one of the great
leaders of this century. It is the job of the statesman to define the
line of „main effort“ at each stage of the struggle. Arafat
was right when he decided, in the early 60s, against much opposition,
that the main effort must be the armed struggle. Sad to say, only
violence put the Palestinians on the map again. He was also right when
he decided, after the October 1973 war, that the main effort must now be
a Palestinian-Israeli accommodation. That has already given the
Palestinians a territorial base, however small. I believe that he is
right in believing that now the main effort must be the proclamation of
the State of Palestine.
The Titanic option
Bishara is right in
saying that the mere proclamation of the state will not solve the
outstanding problems – Jerusalem, settlements, borders etc. Of
course not. But the real question is: Will statehood, recognized by the
vast majority of governments throughout the world, improve the chances
of he Palestinians in achieving a viable solution? For me, the answer is
quite clear. The "imbalance of power" will not disappear as if by magic,
but it will get smaller. The creation of the state will not be the end
of the struggle, but the beginning of a new chapter of the struggle. The
state is not the solution, but the means for achieving the solution. It
is not an end by itself, but an instrument for attaining that end.
With the biting irony
adopted by many in the Palestinian opposition, Bishara reminds us that a
State of Palestine has already been declared once. How many times, he
asks, can one declare a state? But Bishara is far too intelligent not to
perceive the difference. The Algiers declaration was a symbolic act, a
declaration of intent. Today, when there already exists a Palestinian
entity on the ground, which includes most of the Palestinian population
on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, the implications of statehood
are vastly different. Bishara fears that such a step would finally cut
the ties between the Palestinians inside Palestine and the millions
outside. Frankly, I fail to see that. Quite on the contrary. The exile
of the refugees is a fact, part of reality, a tragic legacy of past
failures. This reality cannot be changed by patriotic slogans. But a
State of Palestine, which will issue passports to all Palestinians and
turn them at least into absentee citizens, will strengthen the ties of
the refugees with the homeland and with the other parts of their people,
improve their situation wherever they are, and strengthen thechances for
a just solution. Indeed, does anyone see another way?
Another fact of life,
bemoaned by Azmi, is Palestinian dependency on the Israeli economy. The
mere proclamation of the state will not change that. But a state will be
in a much better position to improve the situation, conduct
negotiations, receive credits, facilitate exports, improve the lot of
workers abroad (including Israel). It will also issue its own currency
– by the way, a step of major economic importance, as Ben Gurion
realized and set in motion just days after the declaration of the State.
Azmi argues that
statehood will not put an end to Israeli settlement activity. But that
makes it all the more urgent! This offensive against the very existence
of the Palestinian people goes on relentlessly, giving a crucial urgency
to counter-measures. Time is of the essence. It absolutely forbids
Palestinians to say, as Bishara seems to be doing: Let’s wait
until the balance of power changes. Let’s first put our house in
order, strengthen democracy, reform the PA. That’s like the
captain of the Titanic saying: Let’s first clean the cabins and
renovate the dining hall. A state is in the position to take action,
mobilize forces, press for international action, alarm world public
opinion. It certainly will not worsen the situation.
That leaves us with the
possibility of armed conflict. The Israeli government may react
violently to the declaration of statehood. This eventuality must be
taken into consideration by the Palestinian leadership, as it certainly
will. But if one lets this threat to decide the issue, it would make
every single Palestinian option subject to the threat of Israeli armed
intervention. This means abject submission. Azmi Bishara would certainly
not accept that.
The Binationals
What, then, is the
alternative? At the end of his 500-line article, Bishara devotes the
last six lines, as a kind of afterthought, to "a binational solution".
With all due respect, I do not quite believe that Bishara arrived at
this conclusion by way of elimination, after despairing of all other
options. Quite on the contrary, I believe that the whole brilliant
analysis was written down with the sole intent of arriving at this
"afterthought".
The dream of a
binational state is as old as Zionism. It was invented by left-wing
Zionists, at a time when the Jews were yet a small minority in
Palestine, with the aim of allowing for massive immigration and land
acquisition without a bloody confrontation with the Arab majority. Not
surprisingly, the offer did not find any Palestinian takers. Later it
was taken up by the Palestinians, when they had become the weaker side.
They thought to evade the necessity of confronting the reality of Israel
by speaking about a „democratic, non-sectarian state, in which
Jews, Muslims and Christians will live together as equals“. For
Israelis, this was just a polite way of saying that their state must be
dismantled. Thank you but no, they said unanimously. No takers again.
Nowadays, this dream experiences a curious resurrection. Some
intellectuals, both Israelis and Palestinians, are taking it up, some
half-heartedly, some with gusto. Their motives seem to be as diverse as
their personalities and political histories.
Some, like professor
Noam Chomsky, who in his youth had lived some time on a left-wing
Kibbutz, are nostalgic idealists. It was such a beautiful dream, after
all. Since then their own logic has forced them, reluctantly, to accept
the two-states solution, but now that this program has run into so many
difficulties, why not return to the dream? Others, like Bishara, so it
seems to me, oppose the two-states solution mainly because they are
opposed to states in general. They dislike the idea of a Palestinian
state as much as the idea of the Israeli state. Did not the followers of
Karl Marx foresee the "withering away" of the state? A "binational
solution" – avoiding even the term "binational state" –
sounds nice. Why cling to past and present structures, instead of
jumping straight into the distant future? Also, Knesset-member Bishara
sees in the binational state a solution of the particular problem
troubling the Palestinians who are citizens of Israel. They will not be
partners in the State of Palestine, while not really "belonging" to
Israel either. In a joint, binational state, they will be in the center.
Then there are Palestinians for whom a binational state is just a method
of doing away with the State of Israel, to which they have never really
become reconciled. Some, like Eduard Said, I suspect, are motivated
mostly by a violent antipathy towards the PA and Yassir Arafat
personally. If the Palestinian state cannot be ideal, they seem to say,
let’s not have a state at all. Let’s have something else,
even if it takes generations to achieve.
Somewhat similar
feelings motivates the handful of extreme left-wing Israelis, who have a
profound hatred for Zionism and would like to liquidate all its
manifestations. They are totally out of touch with Israeli reality. They
are also, by the way, the most extreme haters of Yasssir Arafat, whom
they daily accuse of all possible and impossible faults and vices, from
corruption to tyranny. They serve, unconsciously, the ends of the
extreme right-wingers in Israel, who see in these "facts", coming from
the mouths of certified left-wingers, a perfect justification for their
opposition to the creation of a Palestinian state and – of course
– the restitution of Palestinian lands. By the way, Israeli
right-wingers also find much solace in the activity of those Palestinian
human rights activists who preach their gospel mostly in the Israeli
media, saying that the situation of the Palestinians under Israeli
occupation was much better than under the PA. Why should Israel give up
the occupation, if the Palestinians themselves confirm that their lot
under the occupation was much better than under their own
administration? And why should people of goodwill around the world
continue to support the struggle for Palestinian rights, if in the end
nothing will come out of it but another little despotic and corrupt Arab
state?
It won’t work
However, whatever the motives of its advocates, the proposal for a
binational state deserves to be analysed on its own merits. The real
questions are:
(1) Is there a chance that the two sides will accept a
binational state?
(2) If so, will a binational state really function?
(3) If so, will this put an end to the conflict?
My answers to all three questions are an unequivocal no.
(1) There is no chance
whatsoever, that the Israeli side would accept such a solution in the
foreseeable future – and no other future is relevant. It
contradicts the basic Zionist ethos of the State of Israel. For
non-Israelis to understand this, they must look back at the origins of
the Zionist movement. It was founded at the end of last century as an
answer to European nationalism. Throughout the 19th century, nationalism
became the dominant political and social creed, sweeping people after
people. One of its dominant features was anti-Semitism – from the
pogroms in Russia to the Dreyfus Affair in France, from the intellectual
anti-Semitism of a Richard Wagner to the populist anti-Semitism of a
Karl Lueger, the mayor of Vienna at that time, the first politician
elected on an undisguised anti-Semitic platform. After all the efforts
of the Jews to become "assimilated" individually failed, Zionism was an
effort at collective assimilation. If there was no place for the Jews in
any of the nations of Europe, the Jews would cease being a religious
community and constitute themselves too as a nation in the European
sense and create a state of their own, where they could express their
identity and decide their own fate. This was the basic idea of Zionism.
Underlying it was the popular Jewish feeling that after centuries of
persecution, there should at long last be one place where Jews could
live among themselves, without the interference of "Goyim" (Gentiles).
Israel the embodiment of this idea. It is, officially, a "democratic
Jewish state", meaning that it belongs to he Jews, but that non-Jews can
live there with equal civil rights. (In practice, even after 51 years,
non-Jews in Israel are very far indeed from such equality.) These
attitudes are not only official doctrine, they are deeply embedded in
the mentality of almost all Israelis. They are imparted to the next
generation in all Israeli schools, both secular and religious, as well
as to all new immigrants. The binational idea does, therefore, negate
the very essence of the Zionist idea, the "raison d’etre" of
Israel as perceived by its Jewish citizens. It would be far easier for
them to accord its Arab citizens special rights as a national minority
(as proposed by Bishara) than to turn Israel into a non-national state
(as also proposed by Bishara) – and even that idea is very far
from the hearts of most Israelis. It can be argued that popular
attitudes may change, that Zionism may fade away, that ideas like a
non-national, supra-national, multi-national or bi-national society will
take roots. But such a basic transformation can only come about over a
long period of time, by a slow development. Can the Palestinian people
wait for 50, 100 years for such a miracle to happen? With the relentless
push of Israeli settlements going on, what will remain of Arab Palestine
until then? On the other side, is the Palestinian people really ready to
accept a binational state, not as an abstract idea, but as a political
and social reality, with all that it entails? I cannot voice an opinion
on that, but I do have my doubts. The Palestinian people need a
confirmation of their national identity, as much as the Israelis did. If
they will not experience statehood, they will always feel that they have
been deprived of something that all other nations enjoy – national
pride and recognition, a place of their own in the family of nations, a
flag, a passport. Perhaps Azmi Bishara feels no need for this, but most
human beings do.
(2) However, let’s
assume for a moment that both people would agree to a binational state,
could it really function? I am not aware of a single instance of two
nations living peacefully in one common binational or multinational
state. It is easy to point at the former Yugoslavia, particularly at
Croatia and Bosnia, not to mention Kosovo. Some might argue that
that’s too easy, that these are backward peoples crazed by mutual
hatreds, while we are civilized. But what about Canada, where two highly
civilized communities, divided by nothing but language, totter
perpetually on the brink of break-up? Half of the Quebecois want their
own national state, and they are likely to achieve this in the
foreseeable future . Belgium is another "civilized" example. Walloons
and Flemings have been living together now for centuries, but their
relationship in the common state of Belgium is at best an uneasy one.
Even in Scotland there is now a strong movement for independence. The
most typical example of a binational state, consciously created as such,
is Cyprus. Two peoples, crowded together on a small island, tried after
centuries of mutual hatred to create a model constitution, which took
into account the nationalist feelings of both. The result was disaster.
Lebanon is another warning, Different communities are bound together by
a kind of constitution which apportions all power according to a fixed
division. This led to bloody civil war, occupation and repeated foreign
interventions. Yet one can argue that there is but one Lebanese nation,
speaking the same language, divided only on ethnic-religious lines.
Hardly a success story. The one shining example of different peoples
living in the same state is Switzerland. But this is a unique structure,
the result of a long historical process which went on for centuries, the
very opposite of an artificial creation imposed by an act of will. It is
utopian to believe that Israelis and Palestinians, two extremely
nationalistic peoples, could turn practically overnight from total
enemies into loving compatriots, able to live and function in one common
society. Tel-Aviv is not Zurich, Ramallah is not Geneva.
(3) If such a state were
created, what kind of state would it be? Would it put an end to the
conflict? In such a state, Israeli superiority in nearly all practical
fields – economic, social, military – is such, that the
Palestinian would automatically turn into an exploited underclass,
devoid of real power. Such a situation does exist now in Israel proper,
with the Arab citizens, nearly 20% of the population, living mostly on
the border of poverty, in circumstances visibly below those of Jewish
communities. Many parts of the administration and the economy are closed
to Arabs, officially or unofficially. In the binational state, the
national struggle will by no means cease. It will make it much easier
for Jews to buy up Arab lands on the West Bank, control immigration and
take other measures to safeguard national superiority. Some may believe
that, in the course of time, demographic facts in the binational state
would change this balance of power in favor of the Palestinians, who
would immediately constitute some 40% of the population, with a vastly
bigger rate of natural increase. Since the state would be democratic, it
would automatically follow that power and economic privilege would pass
in due course into the hands of the Arab Palestinians, who might then
change the name, the flag and the identity of the state. That is a naive
picture. If somebody believes that Israelis would relinquish power out
of sheer democratic conviction – all one can say is that such a
belief is touching. Much more probable is a development in the direction
of the former South Africa, with years and years of violent struggle
ahead. Even today, with an Arab minority that constitutes less than a
fifth of its population, only few Jewish Israelis are ready accept the
slogan "a state of all its citizens". One of Israel’s laws says
that nobody is allowed to take part in elections if he does not accept
that Israel is "the state of the Jewish people". Will Israelis
voluntarily reconcile themselves to the idea of living in a state in
which two of every five citizens will be Palestinian – with a
Palestinian majority in sight? A binational state is not an abstract
thing. It means that both nations must enact the laws together and abide
by them, irrespective of the differences in their social evolution,
mental outlook and cultural background. It means that they must agree on
the laws of immigration, for example, on the levying of taxes and the
distribution of tax money. Social services will have to be apportioned
to the different communities. That is difficult enough in an ordinary
state. For two different people, living together in a single state might
turn into a nightmare. Again, mentalities might change. New generations
may entertain different ideals. But how long would it take? What would
happen to Palestine on the way? Indeed, who can prophesy the
developments with any pretense of certainty?
The Two-State Solution
Immediately after the 1948 war, when I called, for the first
time, for a two-state solution, I was not animated by nationalist
fervor, nor did I believe in the holiness of states. For me, then and
now, states are a necessary instrument at this point in time. And I had
– and still have now – a healthy respect for the power of
nationalism. Communism, Fascism and many other isms of the 20th century
have disintegrated without leaving a trace, but nationalism has
triumphed. Perhaps it expresses a basic human urge, perhaps it is only a
sign of the times. But nationalism is here to stay for a long time.
Seemingly, there is a paradox. We see that economic, political and
military realities are leading inevitably towards regional units, such
as the European Union. But at the same time, smaller and smaller units
demand self-expression. While real power moves from London, Paris and
Madrid to the EU, Scots, Bretons, Basques, Catalans demand autonomy and
even independence. To my mind,this is quite logical. Real power moves
slowly from state to region, from region to global structures. This
process releases small peoples from the necessity to give up their
identity, culture, language and self-government in areas that were
expropriated by the bigger units. If the big economic and military
decisions are made by Europe, why must Corsica subject itself to Paris?
The idea of an
Israeli-Palestinian two-state solution was always based on the
assumption that the border between them will be open, and that that they
will have a joint capital in Jerusalem. The guiding vision is not
"separation", in the bad sense of the word, but partnership, with each
of the two nations expressing its identity in a national home of its
own. I am convinced that after living together, side-by-side, with
Jerusalem as their common capital, the State of Israel and the State of
Palestine will grow slowly together, under the pressure of geography and
economics, and form a kind of federation based on mutual trust and
interest. That, after all, was the basis of the UN resolution 181, which
Palestinians remember nowadays with a new-found fondness.
As I wrote 51 years ago,
both states should be part of a Semitic Union, on the lines of the
present European Union. (I chose the term "Semitic" because it is the
only one which is common to the two peoples and the two languages,
emphasizing a common historical and linguistic heritage.) It must not be
forgotten, that the European Union came into being after a profound
debate between the idealists, who preached a kind of United States of
Europe, and the realists, like Charles de Gaulle, who advocated a
"Europe of Fatherlands", based on existing states, each with its own
identity and flag. This vision won. A process which takes into account
the power of nationalism may be slower, but it certainly is more
realistic. As has been proven by now, it does reach the desired end. The
Euro has come, borders have been practically eliminated, loyalty to
Europe has taken root, with each nation waving the blue flag of Europe
next to its own national flag.
Much the same, I hope,
will happen in our region. Israel and Palestine (and perhaps Jordan too)
will rapidly or slowly grow together into a kind of federation, becoming
part of a regional union. Thus the positive parts of the "binational
solution" will become reality in a natural process.
In the early 50s, those
of us who advocated a two-state solution stood alone. The US and the
Soviets, Europe and the Arab states, Palestinians and Israelis were
united in their opposition to this program, if in nothing else. Much
later, in 1971, long after the PLO had already become an important
factor, the official PLO publishing house in Beirut published a book by
Camille Mansur, in Arabic and French, titled "Uri Avnery and
neo-Zionism", in which they condemned the "Avnery Plan" (sic!) of a
two-state solution as a "plot against the Palestinian revolution". Now
this plan is accepted by practically all governments, by most Israelis
and the great majority of Palestinians. They were converted by the logic
of reality.
On May 4, 1999, 500
prominent Israeli intellectuals and peace activists, including some of
the most illustrious names of Israeli arts and letters, signed a
manifesto stating: "We support the right of the Palestinian nation to
declare the establishment of the State of Palestine in all the
territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, with united Jerusalem
serving as the capital of both states – West Jerusalem as the
capital of Israel and East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine. The
co-existence of Israel and Palestine, side by side, is the basis of
peace, security and reconciliation between the two nations."
The historical moment
Should the Palestinians
have declared their state on May 4, 1999? Instinctively I would have
said: Yes. There comes a moment in the life of a nation when it must
say: To hell with all tactics, let’s do what we have to do!
However, on second
thought I believe that the Palestinian leadership was right to postpone
the act for a few months. The Israeli elections were only one reason for
that. The declaration would certainly have helped Benjamin Netanyahu, an
unscrupulous demagogue, to win the elections and form an extreme
right-wing, nationalistic-fundamentalist anti-Palestinian coalition.
Palestinian self-restraint made the remarkably victory of Ehud Barak
possible. Barak may turn out to be as difficult as Yitzhak Rabin was at
the beginning of his reign, but he is a logical person and represents
the realistic part of Israel. Realism and logic will inevitably lead him
to the two-state solution, even if we still have a tough struggle ahead
of us, corning borders, settlements and – of course –
Jerusalem.
It seems to me that the
main reason for the postponement was the reasonable chance the United
States, Europe and the vast majority of governments around the world
will in the end recognize the State of Palestine, if the ground is
prepared carefully, and that is what Arafat has been doing. The success
of this effort is worth a short postponement.
Also, perhaps under the
leadership of Barak an agreement can be achieved, which will make it
possible to proclaim the state by consent. At the moment, Barak sets
conditions which are unacceptable. But in the course of negotiation
conditions may change, especially if the Israeli peace forces keep up
the pressure, as my friends and I fully intend to do. If a strict
time-limit is set in advance, it is, at least, worth a try. If this
fails, should the Palestinians, then, proclaim their state within a
year? My answer, for what it’s worth, is: Yes. Absolutely.
When? On the last day of
this millenium? In the beginning of 2000? Only the Palestinians
themselves can answer that.
WE KNOW, THAT
EVERY SHEKEL
FOR THE SETTLEMENTS
IS A SHEKEL AGAINST PEACE!
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