bitterlemons-international.org
Middle East Roundtable /
Edition 13
No compromise:
Power will not moderate Hamas by
Martin Kramer
[DEUTSCH]
The election of Hamas has prompted an epidemic of
self-induced amnesia among pundits who interpret Palestinian politics. For
years they argued that Israel should do everything to bolster Yasser Arafat,
and later Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), lest Hamas gain ground. Hamas would
grow if Israel did not make far-reaching concessions, thus destroying any
prospect of a negotiated peace.
But now that Hamas has assumed power, these very same pundits ooze
reassurances that Hamas is a partner for Israel after all. True, it has yet
to recognize Israel, renounce violence, or dismantle its clandestine
"military wing". True, it declares openly that it will do none of those
things. But this is mere rhetoric, insist the pundits. Now that Hamas is in
power, it will have no choice but to accept Israel de facto.
The problem with this interpretation is not that it ignores the past history
of Hamas. The problem is that Hamas acquired power too easily. It has never
sat in opposition, joined a larger coalition, or acquired the habit of
compromise.
Hamas entered parliament with an absolute majority in its first election. It
has achieved, in 20 years, what the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has not
achieved in 80 years. Turkey's Islamists, regarded as the model of Islamist
moderation, came to power only after decades of up-and-down parliamentary
politics.
Hamas, in contrast, has never experienced any period of across-the-board
suppression. Leaders of the movement were targeted by Israel, and some of
its activists did time in Israeli prisons or were forced into exile. But
Hamas has been largely free to organize, publish, acquire arms and launch
attacks.
Islamist movements have been domesticated in strong states, where they have
learned to interact with more powerful forces. But in the West Bank and
Gaza, Arafat preferred struggle to state-building. Hamas accepted his
nominal status as figurehead of the Palestinian cause, in return for almost
complete freedom to do as it pleased.
Not only has Hamas assumed power on its first try. It has done so with its
militia, its guns and its ideology intact. Its speedy and sweeping ascent
has simply validated its past militancy.
Now, late in the game, the United States, Israel and Europe seek to extract
from Hamas those gestures of acquiescence Hamas would not make when it was
weaker. It is no surprise that Hamas evades them. Like Hizballah, it
believes itself to have forced an Israeli retreat. It won a decisive
electoral victory without parallel in the Arab world. And Hamas is convinced
it enjoys the sympathy of millions of Arabs and Muslims, prepared to extend
unconditional moral and financial support. Why should it bend?
Hamas will devote its rule to achieving three goals. First, it will seek to
consolidate its grip over the institutions of the Palestinian quasi-state,
at the expense of Fateh. Second, it will move gradually to Islamize
Palestinian life. (Hamas will meet less resistance than secular observers
think. Last year, a poll showed that two-thirds of Palestinians believe
Islamic law should be the sole source of legislation.) Third, it will write
its own "roadmap" in Palestinian consciousness, leading away from a
two-state solution. For that purpose, Hamas will make the media and the
schools into extensions of the mosques.
Hamas might continue the tahdiya, the informal "hold-your-fire", if Israel
executes more unilateral withdrawals. But this process will slow or stop
somewhere well short of the green line. Then, if not earlier, Hamas is
liable to open space for "resistance"--terror which, to its mind, is the
only language Israel understands.
The Hamas concept of victory through "resistance" not only delegitimizes
Israel's peace with Egypt and Jordan. It undercuts the United States, which
trades on its reputation as the only force that can deliver Israeli
concessions. Israel, the US, Egypt and Jordan thus have a vital interest in
seeing Hamas fail. So too does Europe, which has invested heavily in
Palestinian civil society.
To make Hamas fail, the Palestinian electorate must be made to realize that,
tough as life has been, Hamas is making it worse. If Hamas is allowed to
feed the Palestinians both bread and illusions, the bread will sustain the
illusions. Only a regime of targeted economic sanctions can break the cycle.
Palestinian pollsters tell us that Palestinian opinion largely favors
negotiation with Israel. Hamas thus needs the illusion of a "peace process"
created by desultory contacts with foreign governments and mediators. If
Hamas is to fail, it must be denied any legitimacy for which it refuses to
pay a price. That requires an effective diplomatic blockade.
Will Hamas evolve? History shows that Islamist movements change only when
confronted with strong counter-forces. Hamas has never faced such forces; it
must be made to face them now. Power will not moderate Hamas. The prospect
of losing it just might.- Published 27/3/2006 © bitterlemons.org
Martin Kramer is senior associate emeritus at the Moshe Dayan Center, Tel
Aviv University. He is also the Wexler-Fromer Fellow at the Washington
Institute for Near East Policy.
[DEUTSCH]
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